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Hiding Data and Structure
in Workflow Provenance
Susan Davidson, Zhuowei Bao, and Sudeepa Roy
Department of Computer and Information Science,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
{susan,zhuowei,sudeepa}@cis.upenn.edu
Abstract. In this paper we discuss the use of views to address the prob-
lem of providing useful answers to provenance queries while ensuring that
privacy concerns are met. In particular, we propose a hierarchical work-
ﬂow model, based on context-free graph grammars, in which fine-grained
dependencies between the inputs and outputs of a module are explicitly
speciﬁed. Using this model, we examine how privacy concerns surround-
ing data, module function, and workﬂow structure can be addressed.
1 Introduction
Provenance in scientiﬁc workﬂows is of increasing interest, as evidenced by sev-
eral recent workshops, tutorials, and surveys on the topic [5,6,18,23]. A number
of tools for capturing provenance have been developed in workﬂow systems such
as myGrid/Taverna [19], Kepler [7] and VisTrails [13], and a standard for prove-
nance representation called the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [17] has been
designed. By maintaining information about the sequence of module executions
(processing steps) used to produce a data item, as well as the parameter settings
and intermediate data items passed between module executions, the validity and
reliability of data can be better understood and results can be made reproducible.
A repository that includes workﬂow speciﬁcations, executions and provenance
information – provenance-aware workﬂow information – is clearly useful in many
ways. For example, scientists who wish to perform new analyses may search by
keyword to ﬁnd speciﬁcations of interest to reuse or modify. They may also
search executions associated with a speciﬁcation to understand the meaning of
the workﬂow, or to correct/debug an erroneous speciﬁcation. Finding erroneous
or suspect data, a user may then wish to ask structural provenance queries to
determine what downstream data might have been aﬀected, or to understand
how the process failed that led to creating the data.
However, authors/owners of workﬂows may wish to keep some of this prove-
nance information private. For example, intermediate data within an execution
may contain sensitive information, such as the social security number, a med-
ical record, or ﬁnancial information about an individual. Although users with
the appropriate level of access may be allowed to see such conﬁdential data,
making it available to all users through a workﬂow repository, even for scientiﬁc
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purposes, is an unacceptable breach of privacy. Beyond data privacy, a module
itself may be proprietary, and hiding its description may not be enough: users
without the appropriate level of access should not be able to infer its behavior
if they are allowed to see the inputs and outputs of the module. Finally, details
of how certain modules in the workﬂow are connected may be proprietary, and
therefore showing how data is passed between modules may reveal too much of
the structure of the workﬂow. There is thus an inherent tradeoﬀ between
the utility of the information shown in response to a search/query and
the privacy guarantees that authors/owners desire.
One technique that can be used to hide details of a workﬂow is to create
composite modules which encapsulate subworkﬂows. Composite modules can be
combined to create views of a workﬂow and its associated executions, showing
users a subset of provenance information and hiding the rest within unexpanded
composite module executions. Originally proposed in [4] as a technique for focus-
ing user attention on relevant provenance, views can also be used to hide private
information, which may include the intermediate data and modules within a
composite module as well as the dependencies between the inputs and outputs
of the composite module.
In this paper, we examine the use of views to implement workﬂow provenance
privacy. We start in Sec. 2 by describing a model for workﬂow speciﬁcations,
executions, and views. We continue in Sec. 3 by describing initial results on
module and structural privacy, and discuss the connection to views. We close by
pointing to future directions for research.
2 Workflow Model
Our workﬂow model has several components: speciﬁcations, runs, execution
graphs, port dependencies, and provenance graphs. A workﬂow speciﬁcation de-
scribes the design of a workﬂow, while a workﬂow run (together with information
about the data and processes) describes a particular execution of the given spec-
iﬁcation. Following [3], a speciﬁcation is given by a context-free graph grammar
and the runs corresponding to the speciﬁcation are given by the graphs in the
language generated by that grammar. Port dependencies are used in the deﬁni-
tion of data provenance graphs, and model ﬁne-grained dependencies between
the inputs and outputs of a module. Rather than giving full details of the model,
we illustrate via an example (see [2] for a more formal treatment).
Workﬂow Speciﬁcations. A sample workﬂow speciﬁcation is given in Fig. 1.
The workﬂow estimates disease susceptibility based on genome-wide SNP array
data for an individual as well as information about lifestyle, family history, and
physical symptoms, and outputs a prognosis for the patient along with recom-
mended lifestyle changes [25]. In the graph, boxes labeled M0, . . . ,M16 indicate
modules with input ports indicated by solid circles and output ports indicated by
open circles; and the labeled arrows between output and input ports of diﬀerent
modules indicate potential data ﬂow. Some of the modules in this workﬂow are
atomic (M5, . . . ,M16). The rest of the modules (M0, . . . ,M4) are composite,
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and their expansion to a subworkﬂow is shown by dotted edges labeled fi (the
name of the production rule). In particular, the root of the workﬂow is M0,
which expands via f0 to W1. The correspondence between inputs/outputs of
a composite module and the subworkﬂow to which it expands is indicated in
this ﬁgure by reusing names. For example, the initial inputs to the workﬂow
are (lifestyle,...) and SNPs, and the ﬁnal outputs are lifestyle change
and prognosis, indicated by double arrows into and out of M0, and those
names are reused within W1. There is also intermediate data within subwork-
ﬂows W1, . . . ,W5, e.g. disorders, query, and result.
Note that composite module M3 is recursive, indicated by a cycle, and that
therefore in an execution the atomic module M5 may be executed multiple
times. For simplicity, we have dropped from the ﬁgure the alternate termination
condition for this expansion (M3 −→f5 M5).
Workﬂow Executions. The set of all possible runs of a speciﬁcation is modeled
as the graph language of the corresponding graph grammar. More precisely, it
consists of all simple workﬂows that can be derived from the start module and
contain only atomic module. A workﬂow execution is a run in which each module
is given a unique process id and data ﬂows over the edges. One execution of our
sample speciﬁcation is given in Fig. 2, in which we reuse the name of the module
as the process id unless the module occurs multiple times in the run, e.g. we
use M5.1 and M5.2 for the two executions of module M5. Data items represent
instances of the abstract data in the speciﬁcation, e.g. d1 represents the initial
input of SNPs.
Provenance Graphs. Data provenance in workﬂows is typically considered to
be coarse-grained [9], i.e., the data coming out of each output port of a mod-
ule depends on the data that entered all input ports of the module. However,
the ability to capture ﬁne-grained dependencies is increasingly important in a
number of workﬂow systems, e.g., Taverna 2 [24] and COMAD-Kepler [22], so
we allow the modeling of ﬁne-grained provenance. That is, as part of the speci-
ﬁcation we assume that each atomic module has an associated port dependency
matrix δ(M) showing which inputs are connected to which outputs. This is illus-
trated in our sample execution in Fig. 2 as an edge between input/output ports
within a module execution, which we will call a dependency edge. For example,
in M11 the output d12 depends only on d10 as there is no edge from d2 to d12.
The information contained in an execution allows us to capture provenance for
data items (such as d18 and d19), so we will call them provenance graphs. Note
that the provenance graph for this relatively simple workﬂow is already complex.
Note also that dependency matrix for composite modules in an execution can be
inferred from the dependency matrices of atomic modules as paths of dependency
and dataﬂow edges between input and output ports for the composite module.
A provenance query such as “What data does d18 depend on?” can be an-
swered by ﬁnding all data items at the origin of a path of dependency and data
ﬂow edges that ends at d18. For our example, this would include data items
d1, d2, . . . , d10, but not d11, . . . , d17. In contrast, d19 depends on all data
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items (d1, d3, . . . , d17) but not d2, since there is no dependency between the
ﬁrst input port and second output port in M11.
Views. As noted earlier, certain modules in this execution are composite, in-
dicated by boxes containing subworkﬂow executions (e.g., M0, M1, M2). Con-
trolling the expansion to subworkﬂows can be used to create views, such as the
one of our sample workﬂow execution in Fig. 3. In this view (V 1), users can only
see the expansion of M0 and therefore have no access to any intermediate data
except for d9, and cannot see what modules were executed in the implementa-
tion of modules M1 and M2. For example, the answer to the provenance query
“Does the prognosis d19 depend on the output of a PubMed search?” (where
PubMed search matches modules M8 and M13) would be “yes” with respect
to the full provenance graph of Fig. 2 but “no” with respect to V 1 since these
modules are not visible .
Views may also alter ﬁne-grained dependencies between the input and output
ports of a module, as illustrated by module M2 in Fig. 3. Here, there is a
dependency between the ﬁrst input port and second output port (the given
dependency matrix for M2 in the view) that does not exist as a path within
M2 in Fig. 2. In this view, the output of the provenance query “What data does
d19 depend on?” would therefore include d2 and exclude all intermediate data
except for d9 (i.e., d1, d2, d9).
Finally, we may hide data on edges in a view of an execution (for data privacy)
or delete connections between modules in a speciﬁcation and its executions (for
structural privacy).
3 Privacy
Privacy concerns are tied to the workﬂow components: data, modules, and the
structure of a workﬂow. To illustrate them, consider again the sample workﬂow
in Fig. 1.
Data Privacy. Certain data in a workﬂow execution may be conﬁdential. For
example, the output of M1, i.e. the genetic disorder the patient is susceptible to,
should not be revealed with high probability, in any execution, to users without
the required access privilege. Such data masking is a fairly standard requirement
in privacy-aware database systems, and a variety of well known techniques can be
applied, e.g. access control [21]. A key question to consider is whether access to
aggregated provenance data (e.g. the most frequent genetic disorder) is allowed
and, if so, whether some standard notion of privacy like diﬀerential privacy (see,
for instance, [12]) used in statistical databases is appropriate for our application.
For example, often random noise is added to the output of a statistical query to
achieve diﬀerential privacy in statistical databases, but adding random noise to
the data values may prohibit repeatability of scientiﬁc experiments performed
using a workﬂow.
Module Privacy. Module privacy requires that the functionality of a private
module – that is, the mapping it deﬁnes between inputs and outputs – is not
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revealed to users without the required access privilege. Returning to our exam-
ple, assuming that M1 implements a function f1, module privacy with respect
to M1 requires that no adversarial user should be able to guess the output
f1(SNP, ethnicity) with high probability for any SNP and ethnicity input.
From a patient’s perspective, this is important because they do not want some-
one who may happen to have access to their SNP and ethnicity information to
be able to determine what disorders they are susceptible to. From the module
owner’s perspective, they do not want the module to be simulated by competitors
who capture all input-output relationships. It is easy to see that if information
about all intermediate data is repeatedly given for multiple executions of a work-
ﬂow on diﬀerent initial inputs, then partial or complete functionality of modules
may be revealed. The approach that we take in [11,10] is to hide a carefully
chosen subset of intermediate data, thereby limiting the amount of provenance
data shown to the user and guaranteeing some desired level of privacy. Since
there may be several diﬀerent subsets of intermediate data whose hiding yields
the desired level of privacy, and certain data may be more useful utility-wise to
users than other data, this becomes an interesting optimization problem.
Note that there is an interesting connection between data and module privacy:
If a module is public (i.e. its function is known), then its output can be simulated
if the inputs are public. Therefore, hiding the output of a public module may
also require hiding some of its input. Furthermore, if a module is invertible then
its input can be simulated if the outputs are known. Again, hiding the input of
a public module may also require hiding some of its outputs.
Structural Privacy. The goal of structural privacy is to keep private the in-
formation that some module M contributes to the generation of a data item d,
output by another module M ′. For instance, in the execution of the workﬂow
W3, we may wish to hide the fact that the reformatted data from PubMed Cen-
tral (module M13) contributes to updating the private DB (module M12), and
hence to the output of module M12. One possible approach is to delete edges
and vertices from both the visible speciﬁcation and its execution so as to elim-
inate all paths from M to M ′; for instance, in this example we can delete the
edge M13 → M14. However, by doing so, we may hide additional provenance
information that does not need be hidden (e.g. the existence of a path from
M13 to M15). Another approach would be to avoid altering the structure of
the workﬂow and instead ﬁnd a view in which M13 and M12 are hidden in a
composite module P , so that the reachability of any pair (u, v) in P is no longer
externally visible, but in this case we may introduce some new paths that did not
exist before. Since there may be many diﬀerent views of the same workﬂow, each
of which has a diﬀerent composite module structure and diﬀerent dependency
matrices, we may need to choose the “best” view. Once again one faces a chal-
lenging optimization problem: guaranteeing an adequate level of privacy while
minimizing unnecessary loss of information or introduction of spurious informa-
tion. Techniques from preserving the privacy of social networks [14,1,20,8,16]
may also be useful.
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4 Conclusion
We have presented a model of workﬂows based on context free graph grammars
in which ﬁne-grained dependencies between inputs and outputs of an atomic
(non-expandable) module can be explicitly speciﬁed. Using this model, a view
can be deﬁned using several techniques, including: 1) hiding data in an exe-
cution; 2) hiding substructure within composite modules, e.g. enabling only a
subset of the workﬂow productions, thereby allowing only some composite mod-
ules expansions; 3) hiding data ﬂow edges in the speciﬁcation. We also discussed
privacy concerns in workﬂow provenance – data, module and structure. Applying
a view to an execution yields a subset of the provenance information, in which
module executions and intermediate data of non-expandable modules are not
visible, and hidden data or data ﬂow are not revealed. Note that hiding data
ﬂow edges may introduce false negatives (data that actually is in the provenance
of a given data item is not returned in a provenance query) while using com-
posite modules may introduce false positives (data that is not actually in the
provenance of a given data item is returned) and/or false negatives, depending
on the ﬁne-grained dependency graph associated with the composite module.
The utility of a view to a user can be measured by the number of false positives
or false negatives introduced in the view used to answer provenance queries.
Our approach of using a view to answer provenance queries while ensuring
privacy of the workﬂow components is quite diﬀerent from that used in other
areas (statistical databases, data mining, social networks) where random noise is
added or other randomized mechanisms are applied to guarantee privacy. These
approaches do not seem to be directly applicable to our problem; provenance
queries are quite diﬀerent in nature from aggregate queries, and results of scien-
tiﬁc experiments performed using a workﬂow are expected to be repeatable and
accurate over diﬀerent executions. The chief challenge is have a formal analysis
of privacy and a utility guarantee of the solutions we provide, which leads to
numerous new research directions. In our initial research for module privacy, we
used a weaker notion of privacy called -diversity [15]. In our current work we
are studying whether stronger notion of privacy (such as diﬀerential privacy)
can be applied meaningfully to our application.
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